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Allocation of Risk Based on the
Mechanics of Injury in Sports: A
Proposed Presumption of Non-Fault
by GERALD J. TODARO*
Introduction
Catastrophic injury' or death resulting from participation in
amateur sports2 stimulates a visceral fear of litigation.3 Grow-
ing sophistication in coaching, training, sports technology and
medical care has not only enhanced athletic performance but,
paradoxically, has increased the incidence of lawsuits as well.4
While professional organizations and associations develop and
implement safety practices for various sports, their efforts have
inspired injured athletes to seek redress under traditional theo-
* B.S. University of Tennessee, 1970; J.D. Capital University School of Law,
1974. This article reflects ideas the author developed from litigating sports medicine
and sports injury cases. The author wishes to thank his wife, Barbara Waters, who
has spent most of her adult life in gymnastics, for her helpful comments.
The author acknowledges the excellent research and assistance of Stephen Deffet, a
third year law student at Capital University School of Law.
1. For purposes of this article, "injuries" shall be defined as traumatic and non-
traumatic physical conditions which cause life threatening and severe disabling condi-
tions, whether long term or temporary. Minor medical problems that interrupt
athletic participation for short periods are not included.
2. In professional sports, the maturity level of the participants, fan expectations,
and commercial considerations create an atmosphere of competition far removed
from the amateur level. Claims of professional athletes based upon unsafe conditions
or practices have met with disfavor unless the tortious conduct is both intentional and
specifically designed to injure an opponent. See, e.g., Maddox v. City of New York, 66
N.Y.2d 270, 487 N.E.2d 553 (1985); Heldman v. Uniroyal, Inc., 53 Ohio App. 2d 21, 371
N.E.2d 557 (1977).
3. See, e.g., Quinn, Litigating Youth Sports Injuries, TRIAL 76 (March 1986);
Note, Malpractice on the Sidelines: Developing a Standard of Care for Team Sports
Physicians, 2 COMM/ENT L.J. 579 (1979-80); Lambert, Tort Law and Participant
Sports: The Line Between Vigor and Violence, 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 211 (1978).
4. See, e.g., James v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 299 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1956) (baseball
bat); McCormick v. Lowe & Campbell Athletic Goods Co., 235 Mo. App. 612, 144
S.W.2d 866 (1940) (pole vault); Outwater v. Miller, 3 A.D.2d 670, 158 N.Y.S.2d 562
(1957) (bicycle); Silverstein v. R. H. Macy & Co., 266 A.D. 5, 40 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1943)
(chinning bar); see also Todaro, Sports Medicine Malpractice, TRIAL 34 (May 1985);
Todaro, The Volunteer Team Physician: When Are You Exempt from Civil Liabil-
ity?, 14 PHYSICIANS SPORTS MED. 147 (1986).
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ries of negligence and products liability.5
The imprecise legal management of the element of risk in
contact sports plagues the tort system for the following reasons.
First, the application of the doctrine of assumption of risk im-
pairs the jury's ability to weigh the defendant's negligence
against the athlete's expectations.6 When the athlete's injury is
characterized as a direct result of the defendant's negligent su-
pervision and instruction, the jury may conclude that the ath-
lete never contemplated the defendant's misconduct that was
so instrumental in bringing about the injury sustained.7 Sec-
ond, the technical concept of duty to warn used in design defect
litigation may present an overbroad and unworkable solution
when advising athletic participants about inherent risk of in-
jury.8 Third, the doctrine of informed consent imposes a bur-
den upon the coach or supervisor to explain the extent of the
risks rarely contemplated by an athlete (or his parents) before
entering an organized sports program.9
This article examines the inherent risk of injury existing in
sports participation and the practical difficulties confronting
the legal system in the formulation of a feasible procedural de-
vice to overcome inequitable determinations of liability for
sports injuries.
5. See, e.g., Note, Injuries Resulting from Nonintentional Acts in Organized
Contact Sports: The Theories of Recovery Available to the Injured Athlete, 12 IND. L.
REV. 687 (1979); Philo & Stine, The Liability Path to Safer Helmets, TRIAL 38 (Jan.
1977); Practical Trial Suggestions: Products Liability of Sports Equipment Suppliers,
28 DEF. L.J. 332 (1979).
6. See McGrath v. American Cynamid Co., 41 N.J. 272, 196 A.2d 238 (1963); Meis-
trich v. Casino Arena Attractions, 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959).
7. Rutter v. Northeastern Co. School Dist., 283 Pa. Super. 155, 423 A.2d 1035
(1980), rev'd, 496 Pa. 590, 437 A.2d 1198 (1981).
8. See, e.g., Reidinger, Products: Warning of Obvious Dangers, 72 A.B.A. J. 67
(July 1986); Lambert, Products Liability: Duty to Warn, 29 ATLA L. REP. 111 (1986);
Allee, Post Sale Obligations of Product Manufacturers, J. PRODUCTS LIABILITY 141
(1985); McKenzie, The Cost of Protection, L.A. Daily J., Mar. 31, 1982, at 4, col. 3.
9. In medical "informed consent" situations, the physician must exercise due
care by divulging information that would allow the patient to knowledgeably evaluate
the risks of and alternatives to a specific medical procedure. The physician has a duty
to reasonably explain, in nontechnical terms, the procedure and its risks and benefits.
In addition, the physician must balance the decision to disclose against the effect that
disclosure may have upon the patient's mental well-being. See Canterbury v. Spence,
464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
Contrary to the doctor/patient relationship, where the patient consents to medical
procedures of imminent risk, the athlete would be consenting to playing a sport with
risk less definable but substantially more remote based on injury rates per hour of
participation, level of competition and history of previous injuries.
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Part I of this article discusses the development of sports
medicine and the impact of sports injury analysis, which has led
to rule changes and safety practices designed to reduce the inci-
dence of injury.
Part II reviews judicial attempts to unravel the entangled
concepts of inherent risk, assumption of risk and risk caused by
negligence.
Part III addresses the Inherent Danger Rule, wherein the au-
thor proposes a rebuttable presumption of non-fault. This pre-
sumption endeavors to balance the unreasonable risk of injury
against the achievements of sports safety practices and proce-
dures, without impeding a fair judicial determination of the re-
sponsibility for injury.
I
Development of Sports Industry
Standards of Safety
A. Sports Medicine
In the past two decades, injury prevention has been the prin-
cipal objective in the field of sports medicine. 10 Advancements
in injury prevention result from sports injury analysis which
scrutinizes the biomechanics of sports injuries. For example,
studies of professional, college and high school football injuries
to the thorax, trunk, pelvis, and extremities yielded statistics
showing that about fifty percent of the injuries occurred as a
result of blocking at knee level.1 ' As a direct result of these
studies, the National High School Rules Committee eliminated
blocking between the waist and knee on kickoffs and punts.12
Injuries were reduced from fifty percent to thirty-five percent;
consequently, in 1981, blocking below the waist was essentially
10. The broad field of sports medicine includes not only orthopedic surgeons and
athletic trainers, but also other medical disciplines such as internal medicine, cardiol-
ogy, pediatrics and, of course, neurosurgery. Medical school graduates, athletic train-
ers, nurses and sports scientists are all part of the sports medicine contingent. For
reference to various specialists involved in the medical care of athletes in non-
traumatic sports medicine, see SPORTS MEDICINE (R. Strauss ed. 1984).
11. SCHNEIDER, PETERSON & ANDERSON, Football, in Sports Injuries: Mechanisms,
Prevention and Treatment 6 (1985) (citing Peterson, Blocking at the Knee, Dangerous
and Unnecessary, 1 PHYSICIANS SPORTS MED. 47 (1973) and Pudenz & Sheldon, The
Lucite Calvarium: A Method for Direct Observation of the Brain. 11 Cranial Trauma
and Brain Movement, 3 J. NEUROSURGERY 487 (1946)).
12. Id.
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eliminated in high school football.'3
Studies that identify anatomical structures subject to high in-
jury rates have enabled researchers to assess the injury poten-
tial of various sports. 4 This process is known as sports specific
injury analysis. 5 By understanding which areas of the body are
subject to stress and trauma in specific sports, coaches and ath-
letes may minimize or even prevent disabling injuries through
pre-participation physicals and conditioning programs.'6
The sporadic application of prevailing principles of sports
medicine at the amateur level often falls short of the optimal
expectations of sports medicine specialists. In high school and
many small college programs, budget limitations and an over-
emphasis on moneymaking often results in a lack of team phy-
sicians for other school-sponsored sports. 7 In addition, margi-
nal and even unqualified health care providers often volunteer
13. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF STATE HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATIONS, OFFICIAL HIGH
SCHOOL FOOTBALL HANDBOOK 19 (1985-86). It states: "Blocking below the waist is
prohibited outside the free-blocking zone during all plays. Using an above-the-waist
block in the open field accomplishes the same purpose as the below-the-waist block
but reduces the possibility of injury to the legs of the opponent." Id.
14. See NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE
HANDBOOK 18, 19 (2d ed. 1983). Studies of thoracoabdominal injuries stress the need
for knowledge and awareness of these injuries to abate potentially life-threatening
situations. Mustalish & Quash, Sports Injuries to the Chest and Abdomen, in
PRINCIPLES OF SPORTS MEDICINE 226 (1984). A thorough "understanding of the dy-
namics of a [particular] sport, coupled with a basic knowledge of the. anatomy of the
chest and abdomen" will precipitate greater recognition and emergency treatment of
these injuries. Id.
15. Myers & Garrick, The Preseason Examination of School and College Athletes,
in SPORTS MEDICINE 237 (R. Strauss ed. 1984). Different sports produce different
types of injuries, and "sports specific" refers to the need for awareness of the frequent
medical problems of each particular sport. Id. at 245.
16. See Albright, Van Gilder, Khoury, Crowley & Foster, Head and Neck Injuries
in Sports, in PRINCIPLES OF SPORTS MEDICINE, supra note 14, at 40. Equipment
changes, rule changes, pre-season examinations, medical care standards, and strength
training and testing are examples of significant factors responsible for the diminished
incidences of catastrophic head and neck injuries. Id. at 44-45. See also Friedman &
Nichols, Conditioning and Rehabilitation, in PRINCIPLES OF SPORTS MEDICINE, supra
note 14, at 396. Research suggests that advances in strength building and conditioning
programs exhibit a direct correlation with the improvement of athletic performance
and the decrease of athletic injuries. Id. at 399. See also R. Birrer, Special Considera-
tions in the Injured Child, in SPORTS MEDICINE FOR THE PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIAN
249 (1984) (school-age sports participants should be screened for any condition that
may disqualify them from competition).
17. Rovere, Adair, Yates, Miller & Malek, A Survey of Team Physician and
Trainer Availability and Participation in Intercollegiate Football, 12 PHYSICIAN &
SPORTS MED. 91 (Nov. 1984). The larger, more prestigious, schools generally offer
much better medical care than smaller, less well-known schools. Id.
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their services as team doctors.18 While many well-intentioned
health care providers volunteer their services because a son or
daughter is involved in a program, these volunteers may be un-
trained and unaware of the preparation necessary for emer-
gency intervention in life-threatening situations.
B. The Effect on Athletics
The enthusiasm for sports medicine accounts for the prolifer-
ation of committees, conferences, and organizations which dis-
seminate informative literature about injury prevention and
treatment. Scientific evaluations of the mechanisms responsi-
ble for injury have resulted in rule modifications that prevent
injury.
1. Football
One significant example of sports medicine affecting the
manner in which a sport is played is the adoption, by college
and high school governing bodies, of rules restricting player
contact in football.' 9 Research of head and neck injuries has
led to a ban on head butting, spearing, and stick blocking.2 °
Physicians studying the mechanics of injury have identified
hyperflexion of the neck 21 and a physical phenomenon termed
"axial loading" 22 as being responsible for cervical quadriplegia
in football.23 Research has shown that striking an opponent
with the top of the helmet is the predominant factor responsi-
18. See Todaro, Sports Medicine Malpractice, TRIAL 34 (May 1985).
19. See, e.g., NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, NCAA FOOTBALL
RULES AND INTERPRETATIONS (D. Nelson ed. 1986) [hereinafter NCAA FOOTBALL
RULES AND INTERPRETATIONS]. These rules prohibit: the use of the helmet to inten-
tionally butt or ram an opponent, spearing, striking a runner with the crown or top of
one's helmet, chop blocking, and the grasping of the face mask or any helmet opening
of an opponent. Id. at FR-89 (Rule 9-1 (k)(p)). See also NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
STATE HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATION, OFFICIAL HIGH SCHOOL FOOTBALL RULES (1986).
20. See SCHNEIDER, PETERSON & ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 57.
21. See SCHNEIDER, HEAD AND NECK INJURIES IN FOOTBALL 77-125 (1973).
22. Axial loading is the transmission of force from the skull to the brain, spinal
cord and supporting vertebra. See SCHNEIDER, PETERSON & ANDERSON, supra note 11,
at 25-28.
23. See Burstein, Otis & Torg, Mechanisms and Pathomechanics of Athletic Inju-
ries to the Cervical Spine, in ATHLETIC INJURIES TO THE HEAD, NECK, AND FACE 139-
42 (1982); Virgin, Cineradiographic Study of Football Helmets and the Cervical Spine,
8 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 310-17 (1980); Torg, Truex, Quedenfeld, Burstein, Spealman &
Nichols, The National Football Head and Neck Injury Registry: Report and Conclu-
sions 1978, 241 J. A.M.A. 1477-79 (1979).
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ble for serious neck and spinal cord damage.24 Appropriate
rule changes that recognize these injury-prone mechanisms
have resulted in a reduction of injuries, by two-thirds, to the
cervical spine associated with quadriplegia.25
2. Gymnastics
Studies of patterns of injury in particular sports have led to
specific data faulting coaches for the high incidence of injury.
In gymnastics, high injury rates are considered controllable and
reducible through proper coaching.26 The national governing
body for gymnastics, the United States Gymnastics Federation,
publishes a safety manual which outlines spotting procedures,
proper use of equipment, and approved methods of instruction
intended to reduce injuries.
3. Boxing
While sports medicine has altered the rules of various ath-
letic contests in the interest of athletic safety, no sport gener-
ates more interest and controversy than boxing.28 The
American Medical Association has called for rule changes to
eliminate blows to the head, or alternatively, to abolish the
sport.29 The medical evidence uncovered by animal and experi-
mental studies exposes the price paid by those pursuing a
24. Due to the head being used as, essentially, a battering ram, the rapidly decel-
erated head and the continued momentum of the body may compress the fragile ver-
tebra in the neck. The compression effect from the force of impact can shut off blood
supply to the brain or cause intracranial bleeding, massive cerebral swelling, or a dev-
astating fracture of the vertebra which may result in the severing of the spinal cord.
See SCHNEIDER, PETERSON & ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 25-28.
25. See Torg, Exchange Review: Epidemiology, Pathomechanics, and Prevention
of Athletic Injuries to the Cervical Spine, 17 MED. & SCIENCE IN SPORTS & EXERCISE
295 (1985). Although the author emphasizes that appropriate rule changes recogniz-
ing the mechanism of injury have resulted in a reduction of football quadriplegia by
two-thirds, those injuries occur not only from inadequate coaching technique, but also
from the failure of coaches to curb and prohibit the usage of intentionally improper
techniques by the aggressive athlete. Id. at 298.
26. Weiker, Injuries in Club Gymnastics, 13 PHYSICIAN & SPORTS MED. 63, 66
(Apr. 1985) ("spotting" verified as being "the most significant controllable factor in
determining the rate of injury").
27. UNITED STATES GYMNASTICS FEDERATION, GYMNASTICS SAFETY MANUAL (G.
George ed. 1985).
28. The Medical Aspects of Boxing (A Round Table), 13 PHYSICIAN & SPORTS
MED. 57 (Sept. 1985).
29. See Casson, Siegel, Sham, Campbell, Tarlau & DiDomenico, Brain Damage in
Modern Boxers, 251 J. A.M.A. 2663 (1984) [hereinafter Casson]; Lundberg, Boxing
Should be Banned in Civilized Countries, 249 J. A.M.A 250 (1983).
[Vol. 10:33
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dream as a boxer: a subtle diminishing quality of life and, occa-
sionally, death.3" Medical investigations of head injuries in box-
ing refute claims that wearing head gear or increasing the
amount of padding in a boxing glove will prevent permanent
brain damage.3' Although these medical problems are found
primarily in professional contestants, who do not wear head
protection in matches, the epidemiological studies demonstrate
the potential for brain injury to amateur boxers, as well.32
Boxing highlights two inherent problems in contact sports.
First, athletes rarely understand and comprehend the actual
risk of long-term serious injury. Second, wearing protective
equipment provides a false sense of protection from serious
injury.
4. Future Role of Sports Medicine
Continued research that describes the mechanics of sports in-
jury will play a significant role, although not without objection,
in changing the sports community's preconceived notions of the
inherent risk of injury.
Rule changes demand modification of coaching techniques,
but many injured athletes are victims of inadequate compliance
with, and enforcement of, new rules.33 Intentional violations of
30. See Unterharnscheidt, Boxing Injuries, in SPORTS INJURIES: MECHANISMS,
PREVENTION, AND TREATMENT 462 (1985). See also Estwanick, Boitano & Ari, Ama-
teur Boxing Injuries at the 1981 and 1982 U.S.A./A.B.F National Championships, 12
PHYSICIAN & SPORTS MED. 123 (Oct. 1984). The authors rhetorically ask "[w]hy the
boxer's brain is not as cautiously protected as the runner's foot." Id. at 128.
31. Although medical researchers continue to debate whether brain injury occurs
from a single "knock-out" punch or whether it is dose related, substantial evidence
now establishes that left hooks and right crosses twist the head, causing the brain to
glide and rotate within the skull, tearing vessels and nerve fibers. Unterharnscheidt,
supra note 30, at 468. Another type of impact, translational (linear) acceleration, ex-
emplified by a straight directional blow to the face, causes brain swelling as a result of
the brain banging against the interior of the skull. Id. at 462-63. Although a boxer
may be wearing headgear, a blow that causes the participant to fall and strike his head
on a canvas will, nevertheless, continue to create a violent impact upon the brain,
causing lesions and bruises in the brain itself. Id. at 463-64. See also Corsellis, Bruton,
Freeman-Browne, The Aftermath of Boxing, 3 PSYCHOLOGICAL MED. 270 (1973); Brain
Injury in Boxing, 249 J. A.M.A. 254 (1983); Casson, supra note 29, at 2663; Unterharn-
scheidt, About Boxing: Review of Historical and Medical Aspects, 28 TEX. REP. BioL-
OGY & MED. 421 (1970).
32. Estwanick, Boitano & Ari, supra note 30, at 123; see also Moore, The Challenge
of Boxing - Brain Safety in the Ring, 8 PHYSICIAN & SPORTS MED. 101 (Nov. 1980).
33. At the high school level, the use of the helmet to hit or butt an opponent was
condemned by the National Federation Football Rules Committee. NATIONAL FEDER-
ATION OF STATE HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATIONS, OFFICIAL HIGH SCHOOL FOOTBALL
HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 45. However, despite rule changes and warnings of po-
1987]
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rules designed to limit the risk of injury constitute only a small
part of liability problems involving organized college and high
school athletics. A more common theme of liability concerns
whether a teacher or coach created an unreasonable risk of in-
jury through negligent supervision or instruction.
Hopefully, rule changes eliminating dangerous competitive
conduct,34 limitations on training and practice,35 physical
screening of participants, and better coaching techniques will
continue to reduce the risk of injury. As successful methods
for the overall management of athletes by coaches become
standard, the tort system evaluating the conduct of coaches
should adopt and apply the minimum standards of prudent
care.
36
tential injuries, coaching techniques changed very little. See SCHNEIDER, PETERSON &
ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 28-29. The National Federation Football Rules Commit-
tee stresses that coaches must do everything possible to discourage any use of the
helmet in blocking or tackling, except as a protective piece of equipment for the
wearer's aid. The Committee states:
Those sponsoring interscholastic football have a responsibility to the partici-
pants to do everything possible to eliminate the number and seriousness of
[head fatalities] .... All groups concerned with football, including the rule
makers, coaches and officials are involved in a cooperative campaign to elimi-
nate these [illegal uses. of the helmet which cause] unnecessary injury
hazards.
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF STATE HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATIONS, OFFICIAL HIGH
SCHOOL FOOTBALL HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 47.
34. See, e.g., NATIONAL FEDERATION OF STATE HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATION SOCCER
RULE BOOK Rule 12-6, art. 1, at 31 (1986-87), which states: "A player shall not partici-
pate in dangerous play, which is an act an official considers likely to cause injury to
any player. This includes playing in such a manner which could cause injury to self or
another player (opponent or teammate)." Id.
35. See, e.g., NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK (2d ed. 1983). The NCAA Com-
mittee on Competitive Safeguards and Medical Aspects of Sports develops, collects,
and disseminates information on pertinent sports medicine topics. For example, the
Committee specifies guidelines for the prevention of heat illness during early season
practice in football. Id. at 10. The guidelines also advise against the use of self-pro-
pelled blocking and tackling mechanisms because of the apparent undue risk of head
and neck injury. Id. at 13. See generally Policy No. 9 (additional Committee policies
concerning the authority to medically disqualify a student-athlete); Policy No. 11
(medical evaluations); Policy No. 12 (nontherapeutic drugs); Policy No. 13 (equip-
ment); Policy No. 14 (participation by impaired athletes). Id. at 14, 16.
36. See, e.g., UNITED STATES GYMNASTICS FEDERATION, GYMNASTICS SAFETY MAN-
UAL, supra note 27. The effects of litigation in the sports industry are seen in the
message by the executive director of the United States Gymnastics Federation, who
states that the safety manual itself does not give standards by which a program is to be
run or a child is to be taught. Id. at iii. This statement is designed to defeat the admis-
sability of the manual on the issue of the standard of care.
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II
Development of Standards of Safety
by the Courts
A. Judicial Expansion
Few courts distinguish between the conflicting expectations
of athletes on one side, and coaches and administrators on the
other. In general, coaches in the more competitive sports ex-
pect athletes to pay the price of commitment and to accept the
consequences of training and practice, including bumps, bruises
and painful injuries.3 7 On the other hand, the athletes, espe-
cially minors and their parents, expect coaches to possess, and
bring to bear, the state of the art in instruction, supervision,
equipment, training, safety practices and necessary medical
care. Recently, at least one jurisdiction analyzed this conflict
and found that incompatible assumptions exist between
coaches and athletes as to injurious conditions and circum-
stances accepted as part of the game.38
Theoretically, the traditional concept of foreseeability re-
37. SCHNEIDER, PETERSON & ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 1. The authors of this
article refer to the book, You HAVE TO PAY THE PRICE, written by former Army and
Dartmouth coach, Earl "Red" Blaik and sports writer, Tim Cohane. The book empha-
sizes "the price" one pays when engaging in the game of football. A good example of
an athlete paying and accepting "the price" is Ohio State football player Shawn Bell,
brother of Todd Bell, former Ohio State star and all-pro safety with the Chicago
Bears. Shawn, engaging in pre-season workouts, broke his fibula in a pile up during a
scrimmage. Typical of many highly competitive athletes, Bell commented upon his
injury and rationalized its occurrence with a "paying the price" attitude:
This is just a negative part of the game and football has its ups and downs.
But, I would never get down on football because of this injury, because foot-
ball has been too good to me .... It's one of those things you have to bounce
back from and remain as positive as possible.
Columbus Evening Dispatch, Aug. 16, 1986, at 1C, col. 3.
38. Rutter v. Northeastern Co. School Dist., 283 Pa. Super. 155, 423 A.2d 1035
(1980), rev'd, 496 Pa. 590, 437 A.2d 1198 (1981). The case addresses an important prob-
lem dealing with the practical application of the assumption of the risk doctrine:
"What risks can appellant be said to have voluntarily assumed?" Id. at 1207. The
court suggests that
[o]ne possibility is that he assumed the risk of all injuries related to training
for and playing football. A second possibility is that he assumed the risk of
all injuries related to training for and playing football while under the direc-
tion of coaches who furnished watchful supervision and protective equipment
when needed.
Id. at 1207-08. The court narrowly defined "risk" in the latter sense when analyzing
an athlete's voluntary engagement in athletics. Furthermore, the court stressed that
"the voluntariness of appellant's act must be proximately related to the danger (or
the risk) which caused the injury." Id. at 1208.
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quires the coach to anticipate conduct and conditions that en-
hance the risk of injury.3 9 This approach emphasizes the
coach's duty not only to protect against injury, but also to antic-
ipate conditions precipitated by human behavior or other cir-
cumstances which increase the potential for injuries.
Therefore, as advances in sports medicine expands our knowl-
edge of the biomechanics of injury, the scope of the defendant's
responsibility increases while the athlete's assumption of risk
of injury decreases.
The courts in sports injury litigation frequently have mea-
sured reasonableness in terms of the risk reasonably per-
ceived.40 The range of reasonable apprehension of injury
defines the defendant's duty, i.e., the level of care to be exer-
cised under the circumstances. 41 While the risk of injury per-
ceived in a sport gives dimension to the duty of care required of
the defendant, courts have further complicated the issue by
rarely delineating between avoidable and unavoidable risk of
injury.42 Neither the sports community nor the courts have ad-
dressed the issue of the degree of risk of injury acceptable in
athletic activity. Rather, the courts have ineffectively adjudi-
cated the issue of inherent risk by utilizing the unmanageable
concept of assumption of risk.43
The doctrine of assumption of risk should be transformed
into legal acceptance of unavoidable injuries in sports. The tort
system must look to the nature of the injury, the mechanics of
such injury, the preventability or minimization of such injury
by proper coaching and supervision, and the imperfect nature
of human performance by both athletes and coaches under
competitive stress. This step-by-step approach may yield a
39. See Leahy v. School Bd. of Hernando Co., 450 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1984). The
testimony in Leahy established that the speed and experience of the athletes were
factors likely to affect the proper execution of drills designed to develop specific skills
of the game. Id. at 886. Consequently, a coach would be expected to recognize the
increasing level of injury potential when inexperienced players participate in practice
sessions which require proficiency drills to be performed at faster and faster paces.
40. See, e.g., Meese v. Brigham Young Univ., 639 P.2d 720 (Utah 1981); Leahy, 450
So. 2d at 883.
41. See Brahatcek v. Millard School Dist., 202 Neb. 86, 273 N.W.2d 680 (1979). The
court imposed a duty upon a high school golf instructor to anticipate danger, requiring
effective observation and supervision of the participants.
42. Cf. DeMauro v. Tusculum College, 603 S.W.2d 115 (Tenn. 1980). Here, the
court not only delineated between avoidable and unavoidable risks of injury, but also
recognized that the issue of unavoidable accident should have been submitted to the
jury with proper instructions. Id. at 120.
43. See infra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 10:33
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functional legal concept of "unavoidable yet reasonable risk of
injury" accepted by all athletes who voluntarily participate in
athletics."
B. Duty to Supervise
Lawsuits alleging lack of supervision usually relate to physi-
cal education classes and interscholastic athletic programs and
name school principals, teachers or coaches as defendants.45
Plaintiffs rely on the fundamental proposition that school em-
ployees owe a duty to supervise students adequately.46 Com-
mentators warn that the highest percentage of claims brought
against schools and coaches charge neglect or ignorance of up-
to-date coaching techniques and advances in safety principles."
For example, in 1982, a Seattle jury traumatized the sports
community by awarding a multi-million dollar verdict in favor
of a cervical quadriplegic high school football player.4  The
mechanism of injury was traced to improper instruction on the
fundamental techniques of blocking, tackling and ball carrying,
resulting in the improper positioning of the plaintiff's head at
the point of contact with an opposing player.49
44. See infra notes 53-57, 72-76 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Brahatcek, 202 Neb. at 86, 273 N.W.2d at 680 (the administratrix of an
estate of a deceased ninth grade student sued the school district and the high school
golf instructor after the plaintiff was accidentally killed after being struck by a golf
club during a physical education class); Carabba v. Ancortes School Dist., 72 Wash. 2d
939, 435 P.2d 936 (1967) (claim against the school district for injuries sustained by
participant in a high school wrestling match); Montague v. School Bd. of Thornton, 57
Ill. App. 3d 828, 373 N.E.2d 719 (1978) (student participating in high school gym class
sued the school board and instructor for an injury occurring during a vaulting horse
exercise); Sutphen v. Benthian, 165 N.J. Super. 79, 397 A.2d 709 (1979) (plaintiffs sued
the instructor and school board for injuries sustained during a floor hockey game).
46. See, e.g., Leahy, 450 So. 2d at 883; Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1982);
Benton v. School Bd., 386 So. 2d 831 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Barrera v. Dade Co.
School Bd., 366 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 1979); King v. Dade Co. School Bd. of Pub. Instruction,
286 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1973).
47. See, e.g., UNITED STATES GYMNASTICS FEDERATION, GYMNASTICS SAFETY MAN-
UAL, supra note 27, at 10. The area of supervision is divided into two categories, envi-
ronmental and interventional. Environmental supervision refers to the creation of an
environment that is reasonably risk controlled. Interventional supervision means the
opportunity to intervene between the onset of an accident sequence and the potential
accident. Id.
48. Thompson v. Seattle Pub. School Dist., No. 851-225 (Superior Court of Wash-
ington for King County, filed January 11, 1982).
49. Id.
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C. Rule Violations
In negligence actions, plaintiffs seek to establish the defend-
ant's failure to exercise reasonable care." In sports injury
claims, evidence of rules of play and policy statements which
incorporate prevailing safety practices can supply the trier of
fact with objective standards by which to measure the defend-
ant's conduct.51 Courts have permitted such crucial testimony
on relevant rules and practices. 2
D. Immunity and Consent
The increasing threat of litigation has spawned a quick-fix
movement in the sports community. Litigation-proof devices,
such as qualified immunity statutes and immunity legislation,
attempt to eliminate all but intentional or grossly reckless con-
duct from culpability.53 The sports community's apprehension
has also prompted the NCAA to urge colleges and universities
50. Generally, lawyers litigating injury claims are more effective in the courtroom
if their arguments to a jury, on the issue of liability, are based upon violations of rules,
regulations, and policies formulated by a group or organization whose purpose is
safety oriented. LANE'S GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE §§ 2.23 - 2.28 (3d ed. 1984).
51. See, e.g., Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 Ill. App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975). Where
safety regulations contain set rules governing the conduct of athletic competition, a
participant in such competition, trained and coached by knowledgeable personnel, is
charged with a legal duty to every other participant to refrain from conduct pro-
scribed by this safety rule. Although the claim in Nabozny was one based on an inten-
tional tort, a coach's deviation from appropriate rules of instruction or supervision
designed to protect participants from serious injury provides a powerful and objective
argument to a jury. Cf. Oswald v. Township High School Dist., 84 Ill. App. 3d 723, 406
N.E.2d 157 (1980). The court held that to permit recovery for injuries sustained as a
result of an athlete's breach of a safety rule in an athletic competition involving bodily
contact liability cannot be predicated upon ordinary negligence, but must be based
upon a showing of willful and wanton misconduct. Id. at 159-60.
52. See Meese v. Brigham Young Univ., 639 P.2d 720 (Utah 1981). The court per-
mitted testimony by an expert in the field of biomedical engineering, suggesting that
plaintiff was injured while skiing because the bindings were set too tight or the toe
piece was not adjusted properly, preventing the boot from releasing from the ski. Id.
at 723-24. See also, Rutter v. Northeastern Co. School Dist., 283 Pa. Super. 155, 423
A.2d 1035 (1980), rev'd, 496 Pa. 590, 437 A.2d 1198 (1981). The court held that a former
high school coach should be allowed to testify as an expert on customs and safety
standards utilized by coaches of high school teams, and on the rules imposed to ensure
minimum safety, since such knowledge was not within the common knowledge of the
jury.
53. The following states have qualified immunity statutes: ARIM. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 32-1472 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-624.1. (1979); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2398
(West 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2891(b) (1977); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.037(2) (1983);
OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.231(b) (Anderson 1981); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 30.800(1)(a)(B) (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-218(b)(2) (1976) (incorporating "ath-
letic events" into its Good Samaritan law). Cf. Todaro, The Volunteer Team Physi-
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to obtain an athlete's informed consent.54
Both immunity legislation and informed consent miss the
mark. First, courts and commentators have consistently de-
clined to accept the premise that a plaintiff can consent to the
defendant's negligence.5 At least a few courts have dismissed
the idea that an athlete can consent in advance to negligent
coaching techniques which directly increase the risk of injury. 6
Second, because injury prevention and risk avoidance tech-
niques depend on a continuing education process, immunity
and consent forms offer little incentive for the deterrence of
unnecessary injuries in sports. Although such things may re-
duce and limit litigation, no practical benefit is conveyed to the
athlete.
Information disclosure of the risk of injury should address
two types of risks. First, coaches should disclose the intrinsic
risk of injury, where no amount of instruction, protective
equipment or rule change can prevent such risk. Second, infor-
mation disclosure should include continual instruction on in-
jury prevention and risk avoidance techniques.
Nevertheless, since no plaintiff as of 1986 has successfully
based a claim on a coach's failure to instruct on the intrinsic
risk of injury in sports, the duty to warn means the duty to
cian: When Are You Exempt from Civil Liability?, 14 PHYSICIAN & SPORT MED. 147
(Feb. 1986).
Such legislation is imprudent. For example, in Ohio, legislation is pending to pro-
vide civil immunity to coaches and officials accused of negligence while involved in
nonprofit recreational sports programs, as long as they have completed an unsophisti-
cated annual safety orientation and training program. Public schools and athletes over
age 19 are excluded. See, H.B. No. 1002, 116th GEN. ASSEMBLY, Regular Sess. (1985-
86).
Ironically, volunteer coaches and officials with little experience, desire and time to
commit to a systematic program of safety awareness seem to be the least likely candi-
dates for civil protection. To foster immunity in order to encourage volunteers in
youth sports programs results in a trade-off of safety for numbers.
54. NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 35, at 9 (Policy No. 2: Sport
Safety Guidelines Offered). The NCAA offers the following guideline for use by
school administrators:
Acceptance of risk - "informed consent" or "waiver of responsibility" by
athletes (or their parents if of minority age) should be based on an informed
awareness of the risk of injury being accepted as a result of the student-ath-
lete's participation in the sport involved. Not only does the individual share
responsibility in preventive measures, but also the athlete should appreciate
the nature and significance of these measures.
Id.
55. See, e.g., W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, § 68 (5th
ed. 1984); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 21.3 (1956).
56. See Rutter, 496 Pa. Super. at 590, 437 A.2d at 1198.
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instruct on the principles of injury prevention, avoidance and
minimization.57
E. Protective Equipment
Historically, the bulk of litigation concerning protective ath-
letic equipment has involved strict products liability claims
against manufacturers .5  To help address the need for adequate
equipment, the sports community has established various stan-
dard-setting organizations.5 9  These organizations have devel-
oped industry standards for equipment, with an emphasis on
both the quality and proper use of sports equipment. Even so,
liability based on a coach's faulty instructions or warnings per-
taining to the use of athletic equipment may ultimately rest
with coaching personnel as opposed to the manufacturer. °
57. In Thompson, No. 851-225 (Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 1982), instead of advanc-
ing the dubious claim that a high school athlete participated in a high school football
game unaware of the potential for injury, the plaintiff based the claim upon a duty to
warn of a higher risk of catastrophic injury associated with lowering the head at the
point of contact. Actually, the duty to warn in this instance was no more than a com-
ponent of the general duty and responsibility of the coach to instruct a participant in
the proper technique used by ball carriers when making contact with an opposing
player. Unfortunately, some commentators argue that this case stands for the propo-
sition that an athlete may now recover if not warned or informed of the risks inherent
in football. UNITED STATES GYMNASTICS FEDERATION, GYMNASTICS SAFETY MANUAL,
supra note 27, at 10. However, a careful analysis of the claim in Thompson reveals that
the inadequate warning was based on the coach's failure to tell the young football
player not only how to meet an opposing tackler, but also the consequence of paraple-
gia that may occur when failing to follow the proper technique. Plaintiff's Trial Brief
at 2, Thompson v. Seattle Pub. School Dist., No. 851-225 (Superior Court of Washing-
ton for King County, filed January 11, 1982).
58. See, e.g., Filler v. Rayex Corp., 435 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1970); Fiske v. Mac-
Gregor, 464 A.2d 719 (R.I. 1983); Rawlings Sporting Goods Co. v. Daniels, 619 S.W.2d
435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Durkee v. Cooper of Canada, Ltd., 99 Mich. App. 693, 298
N.W.2d 620 (1980); Everett v. Bucky Warren, Inc., 376 Mass. 280, 380 N.E.2d 653 (1978);
Byrns v. Riddell, 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976).
59. For example, the National Operating Committee on Standards for Athletic
Equipment (NOCSAE) promotes voluntary standards developed to reduce head inju-
ries by establishing minimum requirements of impact attenuation for football helmets
and baseball batting helmets. This group was formed in 1969 and includes the NCAA,
the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics, and the National Federation of
State High School Associations, among others. Other groups concerned with protec-
tive equipment include the NCAA Committee on Competitive Safeguards and Medi-
cal Aspects of Sports, the Joint Commission on Competitive Safeguards and Medical
Aspects of Sports, and the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) (eye
safety).
60. See, e.g., Everett v. Bucky Warren, Inc., 376 Mass. at 280, 380 N.E.2d at 653.
Here, even though the school and the manufacturer were required to exercise reason-
able care not to provide a chattel which they knew or had reason to know was danger-
ous for its intended use, the coach, being a person with substantial experience in the
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F. Medical Attention
The availability of competent medical care is frequently a
question of economic feasibility. In NCAA Division I schools,
football programs generate sufficient revenue to provide for
the medical needs of all athletes, scholarship and nonscholar-
ship.6 ' In contrast, many smaller universities, community col-
leges and most high schools lack the necessary funds to provide
certified trainers, sports medicine specialists and physicians
knowledgeable in the treatment and prevention of sports inju-
ries.62 Occasionally, inexcusable delays in rendering medical
care and the mismanagement of emergency situations have re-
sulted in liability for schools and institutions.63
III
The Inherent Danger Rule
Most athletes willingly run the nonspecific risk of injury inci-
dent to athletic participation.64 However, the combination of
intrinsic danger in sports and indeterminate injury-producing
factors virtually precludes the assumption of risk defense as a
suitable legal instrument to distinguish between inherent dan-
gers and negligent causes of injury. This doctrine is too vague
game of hockey, was held to a higher standard of care and knowledge than an average
person. See also Pell v. Victor J. Andrew High School, 123 Ill. App. 3d 423, 462 N.E.2d
858 (1984) (a faculty member had assembled a mini-trampoline, improperly placing a
caution label so that it was out of view).
61. M. RAIBORN, REVENUES AND EXPENSES OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PRO-
GRAMS: ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL TRENDS AND RELATIONSHIPS 1981-1985 (1986). For
example, for the fiscal years 1981 and 1985, NCAA Division I football programs ac-
counted for 56% and 53% of the schools' total revenue received from sports programs,
respectively. Id. at 17.
62. Roveere, A Survey of Team Physician and Trainer Availability and Partici-
pation in Intercollegiate Football, 12 PHYSICIAN & SPORTS MED. 90 (Nov. 1984).
63. See, e.g., Barth v. Bd. of Education, 141 Ill. App. 3d 266, 490 N.E.2d 77 (1986);
Mogabgab v. Orleans Parrish School Bd., 239 So.2d 456 (La. App. 1970); Duda v.
Gaines, 12 N.J. Super. 326, 79 A.2d 695 (1951).
64. To appreciate the sheer volume of sports related injuries, see, e.g., U.S. CON-
SUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION/DIRECTORATE FOR EPIDEMIOLOGY, 8 NATIONAL
ELECTRONIC INJURY SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (NEISS) DATA HIGHLIGHTS (1984). The
report estimated that hospital emergency rooms treated 3,436,148 injuries related to
"sports and recreational equipment." Id. "Bicycle and accessories" injuries led all
injury categories under the sports and recreational equipment heading with 556,682
(16%). Id. However, basketball, baseball and football followed close behind with inju-
ries totaling 440,293 (13%), 423,126 (12%), and 390,267 (11%) respectively. Id. One
must keep in mind that a significant number of injured athletes never reach a hospital
emergency room because of alternative treatment by team physicians, nurses, and vol-
untary medical personnel.
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and injury-causing factors are too complex to allow continued
reliance on the assumption of risk defense. A better approach
than assumption of risk and consent is a rebuttable presump-
tion of non-fault. In this section, the inadequacies of assump-
tion of risk and consent are discussed, and a rebuttable
presumption is proposed.
A. Assumption of Risk
The doctrine of assumption of risk65 has been found to add
nothing but confusion to modern tort law.6 Most jurisdictions
have either abandoned or severely curtailed the doctrine, in-
stead adopting the doctrine of comparative fault.67 Primarily,
courts have found that assumption of risk is an ambiguous and
hazardous legal tool bound to create confusion.68
The most popular form of the doctrine involves the principle
of implied assumption of risk. Under this theory, courts may
presume that the plaintiff consented to the risk of injury with-
65. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 55, at 68. Basically, the doctrine of
assumption of risk may be separated into three significant categories or definitions:
express assumption of risk, implied or secondary assumption of risk, and primary as-
sumption of risk. Id. at 480-84.
For purposes of this article, assumption of risk is limited to the "implied" assump-
tion of the risk definition, unless otherwise stated.
66. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 21.1 (1956).
67. Twenty-nine states have judicially or statutorily modified or abandoned the
doctrine of assumption of risk. See, e.g., Anderson v. Ceccardi, 6 Ohio St. 3d 110, 451
N.E.2d 780 (1983); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L.R. § 1411 (McKinney 1975).
68. See, e.g., Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54 (1943). The case
addressed an amendment to the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) which
stated that an "employee shall not be held to have assumed the risks of his employ-
ment in any case where such injury or death resulted in whole or in part from the
negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier." Id. at 57, quot-
ing FELA, Aug. 11, 1939, ch. 685, § 1, 53 Stat. 1404, 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1943). The estate
sued on behalf of the deceased, an employee of the defendant railroad company who
was killed while working on the defendant's trains. The lower courts dismissed the
plaintiff's claim, in effect relying on the doctrine of assumption of risk, but calling it
negligence on the part of the employee. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion
ably described the ambiguity of the phrase "assumption of risk:" "[It] is an excellent
illustration of ... a legal formula, undiscriminatingly used to express different and
sometimes contradictory ideas." Id. at 68. The dual meaning of the phrase "assump-
tion of risk," which obscures the legitimate defense of the plaintiff's exclusive negli-
gent behavior, prompted the Supreme Court to characterize the doctrine as too
ambiguous for legitimate application in the courtroom. Eliminating the defense of
"assumption of risk," and relying solely on the plaintiff's negligence to be compared
to the defendant's negligence, if applicable, prohibits an absolute defense and pro-
motes a more equitable resolution of the parties' competing theories.
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out expressly having done so. 69
Comparative fault states have eliminated implied assumption
of risk as a separate defense which completely bars recovery.7 °
Some states have enacted legislation which merges implied as-
sumption of risk with contributory negligence.71
Since the defense of implied assumption of risk is either un-
available or merges with contributory negligence, a separate in-
struction on the inherent risk of injury assumed by the
participant would seem inappropriate.72 Rather, the court and
trier of fact are theoretically confined to the question of
whether the plaintiff acted reasonably. 73 Presumably, a reason-
able assumption of known injurious factors created by the de-
fendant will not reduce the plaintiff's damages. 4
Although the defense of unreasonable assumption of a
known risk is judicially managed in the same fashion as con-
tributory negligence, the standard applied to determine the
plaintiff's knowledge must be clarified by the courts. Tradi-
tionally, a subjective standard was used to gauge the plaintiff's
actual awareness of danger.75 However, if the true meaning of
comparative fault is comparative responsibility,76 then the rea-
sonable man test, an athlete exercising ordinary care for his
personal safety, should effectuate a more precise measure for
the trier of fact's evaluation of fault. When subjecting the
plaintiff to the reasonable athlete standard, the trier of fact
should be encouraged to evaluate the circumstances in which
the athlete participates.
69. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 55, at 368.
70. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 153-80 (2d ed. 1986).
71. Id. at 167-70. Also, some comparative negligence states have retained implied
assumption of risk as a separate and complete defense.' These states include Georgia,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. Id. at 162-63.
72. Some courts have held that it is error to give a separate instruction on assump-
tion of the risk. See Loup-Miller v. Brauer & Assocs.-Rocky Mountain, Inc., 572 P.2d
845 (Colo. 1977); see also Lambert v. Will Bros., 596 F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1979); Segoviano
v. Housing Auth., 143 Cal. App. 3d 162, 191 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1983).
73. UNIF. CoMP. FAULT ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 39 (Supp. 1987). Specifically, an ath-
lete's unreasonable assumption of known injurious factors or conditions incident to an
athletic activity must be weighed against the previously established negligent conduct
of the defendant.
74. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 70, at 173. The author states: "Most comparative
negligence states have now established the same pattern with respect to the legal ef-
fect of merger. Reasonable implied assumption of the risk is no longer a defense." Id.
at 173 n.35.
75. Today's standard of fault is measured in terms of objectivity, based upon a
uniform standard of behavior. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 55, at 173-74.
76. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 70, at 180 n.80.
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A substantial number of injuries can be prevented under op-
timal conditions.77 Deviations from accepted standards of
coaching that increase the risk of injury should constitute the
threshold inquiry for the trier of fact. Thus, if the trier of fact
concludes that the defendant created an increased risk for the
plaintiff, the question then becomes whether the risk reaches
the necessary level of unreasonableness. Errors in judgment
should not entitle the athlete to compensation under the rea-
sonable man test, unless the mistake in judgment is so errone-
ous as to be inconsistent with due care.78
The next factual determination is whether the athlete's con-
duct is reasonable under the circumstances of the athletic en-
deavor in which he engaged. Since the athlete's conduct may
be reasonable whether or not he knew of the increased danger,
it may be entirely appropriate for the trier of fact to find that
the athlete acted free of negligence. For example, head-butting
an opponent in a high school football game is both an illegal
tactic and a highly dangerous method of blocking or tackling.
The question should be: Was the player coached on this unac-
ceptable technique, or was it an isolated incident contrary to
the defendant coach's customary methods of instruction?
The trier of fact's focus should begin with the coach's instruc-
tion on injury avoidance techniques, then proceed to the ath-
lete's compliance or noncompliance with rules controlling
"point of contact" with an opponent. This analysis differs from
the traditional approach in that the focus is no longer on the
known danger of a specific injury, but on the reasonableness of
both parties' conduct given the circumstances leading up to the
actual injury.
The comparative fault system fails to take into account that
one who voluntarily engages in a dangerous activity, even
though he does so in a reasonable manner, should bear the con-
sequences of injury.79 This argument arises from two distinct
principles which underlie the assumption of risk defense. The
first, the lack of duty concept, involves the primary assumption
77. See supra notes 10-36 and accompanying text.
78. See Hyles v. Cockrill, 169 Ga. App. 132, 312 S.E.2d 124 (Ga. 1983).
79. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 70, at 180. The author criticizes the supreme courts
of Wisconsin and Minnesota, which have held that reasonable implied assumption of
risk should not diminish the amount of the plaintiff's recovery. He argues that
"when a person's conduct under the facts is truly voluntary and when he knows of the




of risk by the plaintiff, and operates as a general denial of negli-
gence.80 The second, volenti non fit injuria (to one who is will-
ing, no wrong is done) enlists the defense of consent."1 While
the consent defense presupposes the plaintiff's acquiescence to
the nonspecific dangers of physical activity, it essentially
merges into the defendant's evidence of no liability. In effect,
the defendant prematurely shifts the trier of fact's inquiry to
the plaintiff's conduct, which technically is reserved for consid-
eration only after finding the defendant negligent. This serves
to strengthen the defendant's case by a procedural quirk rather
than the use of admissable evidence.
The elimination of the defense of consent forces the defend-
ant to forfeit substantial leverage against the injured athlete.
In addition, tort reform has jeopardized the element of inher-
ent danger, which formerly gave the defendant a strategic
advantage.
In light of recent trends, few serious disabling injuries will
escape litigation; fewer still will be accepted as part of the
game. Given society's increasing litigiousness and rising expec-
tations of fiduciary responsibility, 2 the sports community must
examine alternatives to the defense of assumption of risk in or-
der to reinstate the compelling argument of inherent danger.
B. Consent to Reasonable Risk
Even if catastrophic injuries and death are identified as in-
herent in specific types of sports activity, the threat of liability
remains problematic when the plaintiff resorts to the tort the-
ory of the failure to warn. 3 Injury avoidance and prevention
measures necessarily embody communication of precautionary
information to athletes. However, an injured plaintiff could
claim a lack of sufficient knowledge about the inherent risk of
a specific sport, which has prevented him from intelligently de-
ciding whether to forego participation. Such a possibility arises
when a unique injury occurs in which the mechanics of injury
are not the subject of a safety practice. It seems unrealistic to
expect a coach to explain every conceivable manner in which
the participant may be injured. The sports community cannot
provide a laundry list of reasonable risks of injury.
80. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 55, at 480.
82. See J. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY 3 (1981).
83. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 55, at 207.
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Unlike hazards in products, 4 adverse reactions to drugs, 5
complications of medical procedures 86 and dangers known to
land and home owners,87 hazards in aggressive sports are easily
identifiable.8 8 No one can claim that he is unfamiliar with com-
mon injuries associated with football or baseball, assuming that
he has either observed or played the game. In contrast, the
duty to warn in products liability8 9 and medical procedure cases
is intended to provide consumers and patients with information
about unknown dangers that is essential for intelligent deci-
sions. Applying this general observation to contact sports, the
potential for traumatic injuries would seem self-evident, even
to most participants. However, in noncontact sports the spo-
radic occurrence of sudden death is most alarming because such
an event is incorrectly assumed to be a risk limited to violent
contact sports.
Although inherent but reasonable risk of injury in sports
ought to be excluded from litigation, it is unlikely that the
courts will deny recovery for failure to warn when the result-
ing injury is serious. Indeed, the idea that amateur athletes
must be warned about all the unavoidable dangers of an obvi-
1
84. Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in
Products Liability Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495
(1976); Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV.
551 (1980); See Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable
Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734 (1983).
85. Franklin & Mais, Tort Law and Mass Immunization Programs: Lessons from
the Polio and Flu Episodes, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 754 (1977); Merrill, Compensation for
Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REV. 1 (1973). See also Feldman v. Lederle Lab-
oratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984); Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637
F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1980).
86. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1973). See also Andrews, Informed Consent Statutes and the Decisionmaking
Process, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 163 (1984); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Ther-
apy, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 628 (1969).
87. See, e.g., W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 55, at § 63.
88. In Columbus, Ohio, the indoor soccer leagues are closed out because of the
sport's tremendous popularity. In talking with parents, the author has found that
soccer is popular partly because parents perceive that there is less likelihood of injury
than in other sports, such as football. Although soccer exists at the intercollegiate
and professional levels in the United States, its national following is minimal com-
pared to football. Nevertheless, even parents with little appreciation of the game of
soccer can determine that kicking or butting a ball from one end of the field to an-
other obviously involves substantially less trauma and a considerably less chance of
injury than, for example, football.
89. See generally, 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCT LIABILITY 153-54
(1960) (discussing the superior knowledge of manufacturers in this age where more
and more complicated products, with potentiality for harm, require product warnings
to prevent injury to the relatively inexperienced layman).
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ously dangerous, injury-producing sport may be the product of
a tort system which is too responsive to enterprising plaintiffs'
attorneys. Nevertheless, the sports community, intimidated by
the perceived threat of legal accountability for lack of informed
consent, has begun urging its constituents to obtain the ath-
lete's consent before participation.9"
Theoretically, a written consent may be necessary not only
where the risk is inherent, but also where the mechanism of
injury is disassociated from prevailing injury avoidance tech-
niques.91 If sports safety research continues to identify the
mechanics of injury, the net result will facilitate expansion of
the instructional capability of coaches while the amount of risk
will be reduced. As risks of injury increasingly become a pre-
rogative of proper coaching techniques, the sports community's
concern for potential litigation, based purely on the lack of ath-
letic consent, should decrease.
C. Presumptions
Teachers, coaches and school administrators who exercise
reasonable care in dealing with amateur athletes ought not to
be responsible for injuries intrinsic to the sport. The best
means for achieving this end is a rebuttable presumption of
non-fault.
1. Evidentiary Presumptions of Fault
In 1979, Colorado adopted comparative fault and abrogated
the defense of assumption of risk.92 In 1979, the Colorado legis-
lature also passed the Ski Safety Act, which created a rebutta-
ble presumption that a skier is at fault whenever he collides
with an object defined by the statute.9 Thus, a skier who col-
90. See NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 35, at 9 (Policy No. 2:
Sports Safety Guidelines Offered).
91. For example, trauma to the lower back may result in the loss of a kidney.
Except when tackling an opponent or blocking close to the line of scrimmage, block-
ing an opponent in the back is a rule violation. Nevertheless, incidental contact may
involve contact above and below the waist and in the front and back of a participant.
Thus, a direct blow to the kidney may occur without violating the rules of the game.
Although such an injury is remote and not common in the sport of football, hypotheti-
cally, the potential for loss of a kidney exists.
92. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-101(1) (1979).
93. Id. The statute reads:
Each skier has the duty to maintain control of his speed and course at all
times when skiing and to maintain a proper lookout so as to be able to avoid
other skiers and objects. However, the primary duty shall be on the person
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lides with persons, natural objects, or properly marked man-
made structures is presumed to be at fault. Rejecting a long list
of constitutional challenges to the presumption, the Colorado
Supreme Court in Pizza v. Wolf Creek 94 upheld this formidable
legal barrier and thereby reduced a plaintiff's chances for
recovery.
The decision openly departed from the traditional eviden-
tiary practice of the disappearing presumption. Under this old.
view, once sufficient evidence was introduced to rebut a pre-
sumption, the presumption disappeared and the jury was not
instructed as to its existence or content.95 The burden of pro-
ducing evidence must shift from one party to another, but the
burden of persuasion remained fixed by common law and the
rules of procedure.96
This approach to judicial management of presumptions, held
by most legal scholars, requires the opposing party to produce
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of fault.97
The Colorado Supreme Court in Pizza v. Wolf Creek sanc-
tioned the jury's consideration of the presumption, conse-
quently foreclosing judicial decision on whether or not the
evidentiary facts upon which it was established were rebut-
ted.9" One must assume that the traditional disappearing pre-
sumption theory was abandoned because such practice would
have defeated the strong economic and social considerations be-
hind Colorado's statutory presumption.
Essentially, what was once an affirmative defense has been
skiing downhill to avoid collision with any person or objects below him. It is
presumed, unless shown to the contrary by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the responsibility for collisions by skiers with any person, natural object,
or man-made structure marked in accordance with Section 33-44-107(7) is
solely that of the skier or skiers involved and not that of the ski area operator.
Id. § 33-44-109(2) (emphasis added).
94. Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Dev. Corp., 711 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1985).
95. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 344 (3d ed. 1984). If the trial
judge determines that the evidence introduced is sufficient to support a finding con-
trary to the presumed fact, then the presumption is spent and disappears and, conse-
quently, the jury will not be instructed as to the presumption. Id. at 974-75. However,
the existing minority view criticizes this approach, suggesting that it is too harsh: "[i]f
the policy behind certain presumptions is not to be thwarted, some instruction to the
jury may be needed despite any theoretical prohibition against a charge of this kind."
Id. at 976.
96. Id.; see also 1 G. WEISSENBERGER, OHIO EVIDENCE § 301 (1980).
97. G. WEISSENBERGER, supra note 96, at § 301.3; see also, C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 95, at 974.
98. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 95, at 978 nn.31-33.
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resurrected as a presumption of fault on the part of an injured
skier, alleviating the burden on the defendant to plead and
prove assumption of risk. The presumption relieves the de-
fendant of the responsibility to introduce testimony disputing
the typical argument advanced by the plaintiff that he did not
know of the risk of actual injury.
Indeed, the Colorado Supreme Court seems to have endorsed
both the imbalance sanctioned by the legislative presumption
and the legal barricade impeding legitimate recovery of a skier
victimized by the negligence of ski area operators. Buttressing
the court's rationale was the legislative reclamation of a natu-
ral inference flowing to ski area operators: injuries inherent in
the sport of skiing are not compensable in court.99
The presumption confers a windfall on the defendant while
increasing the burden of proof on the plaintiff in two ways.
First, the plaintiff no longer comes into the courtroom in a neu-
tral position. Instead, he must present credible evidence rebut-
ting the presumption before incurring the benefits of
comparative fault."°0 Second, the defendant ski area operator is
relieved from proving misconduct on the part of the plaintiff.
The presumption of fault represents an extreme departure
from fundamental notions of fairness. The end result barely
achieves a more equitable resolution than previously obtained
through utilization of the doctrine of assumption of risk,
whereby the judge or jury could easily bar the plaintiff from
recovery. However, the injured skier will more than likely sur-
vive a motion for a directed verdict. He will have his day in
court, and his conduct will be compared to the defendant's, but
the burden of persuasion will be substantial.
To broadly extend the language of this presumption to sports
involving students or minors might present serious constitu-
tional impediments. In Pizza, the ski area operators survived
the constitutional challenges of vagueness, lack of rational evi-
99. Pizza, 711 P.2d at 678-79.
100. Id. The Court considered whether "[t]he skier must prove he was not 'solely
responsible' by proving he was not at all responsible; or, second, that the plaintiff
must prove that he was not 'solely responsible' by presenting evidence of the opera-
tor's negligence which outweighs the presumption of the skier being solely negligent."
Id. at 677. The court rejected the first alternative. Instead, the court construed the
language "as consistently as possible with common law principles of negligence." Id.
The court then held that "[t]he skier has the burden of rebutting the presumption by
presenting evidence of the ski area operator's negligence which outweighs the pre-
sumption of the skier's sole negligence." Id.
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dentiary basis, and violation of equal protection guarantees be-
cause the statutory presumption precisely describes the factual
setting where the injuries and presumption arise.101 In addi-
tion, the presumption was equated to an economic regulation,
subjecting it to less exacting constitutional standards. 2
2. Evidentiary Presumption of Non-Fault
Although state colleges and high schools possess ample eco-
nomic arguments as well as strong interests in health, educa-
tion and welfare, the rational evidentiary basis requirement
may pose difficulties. In skiing cases, a collision with a down-
hill object is the only fact requiring proof before the presump-
tion of fault applies. 103 In some sports, however, contact with
one's opponent (such as blocking and tackling in football) is
permitted by the rules. Consequently, a legislative presumption
involving contact with an opponent is entirely too general.
To some extent, the comparative fault system impairs the
natural inference of the defendant's nonresponsibility drawn
from the factual setting of inherent danger. A more equitable
resolution is a presumption of non-fault. Such a presumption
will encourage the trier of fact to reject claims which stem
from injuries shown to be inherent in the sport. A non-fault
presumption might read:
Every participant engaged in amateur, high school or col-
legiate athletics has the duty to reasonably control his conduct
in accordance with proper coaching techniques based upon
written rules and principles of sports safety designed to pro-
mote safe conduct in sports. Unless shown by a preponderance
of the evidence that a specific injury is unlikely to occur, it is
presumed that death and chronic disabling injuries despite
compliance with rules and principles of sports safety are inher-
ent in the sport and not the fault of the school, club, coach or
instructor.
Under this presumption, a method is created by which the
inherent risk defense may coexist with comparative fault, with-
out unduly obstructing a fair resolution of the injured athlete's
claim.
The proposed presumption is predicated on the idea that
some injuries inherent in sports and impervious to safety meas-
101. See id. at 677-78.
102. Id. at 676.
103. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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ures are not compensable. This ensures a more balanced ap-
proach to separating inherent injuries from injuries due to
tortious conduct.
3. Concepts and Terminology in a Presumption
of Non-Fault
Some of the concepts and terminology used in the proposed
presumption are further discussed.
a. Interscholastic Sports
State affiliated high school and collegiate sports are directly
related to the state's interest in health, education and welfare
of young people. Independent sports organizations, such as
gymnastic schools and diving clubs for young adults, also fur-
ther the state's interest in athletics. If the language of the stat-
ute limits its application to state-sponsored athletic activities,
finding a compelling state interest is not troublesome. As for
recreational athletics, unless it reaches the level of economic
importance of the ski industry in Colorado, the presumption
may be subject to close scrutiny to determine a legitimate state
interest.10 4
b. Written Rules and Principles of Sports Safety
Where written rules govern the conduct of participants for
clear reasons of safety, properly coached athletes cannot legiti-
mately make a claim that the meaning of the rule is vague.
Safety practices implemented by manuals and other written
materials are separate from rules governing the manner in
which the contestants play the sport. Nevertheless, extending
the presumption to written guidelines on prevailing industry-
wide safety practices ought to be part of the statute's language.
Including safety manuals in the presumption will encourage
the development and enforcement of written safety guidelines,
as opposed to reliance upon loose principles of custom and
practice. °5
c. Specific Injuries
As stated earlier, injuries outside the expectations of the ath-
104. Pizza, 711 P.2d at 679.
105. See, e.g., UNITED STATES GYMNASTICS FEDERATION, GYMNASTICS SAFETY MAN-
UAL, supra note 27, at iii.
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lete are neither accepted nor realistically comprehended, even
though coaches and sports administrators expect the athlete to
assume all dangers in sports.10 6 If specific injuries cannot be
avoided by sound coaching techniques, the defendant ought to
be entitled to a presumption which eliminates the necessity of
proof of the participant's knowledge and awareness of potential
injury.
Placing emphasis upon the mechanics of injury is critical to
eliminating confusion between negligent and inherent injuries.
For example, rather than approaching sports injury claims by
questioning whether or not brain damage is part of boxing,
evaluation of the mechanics of the injury by which brain dam-
age can result will reduce the ambiguity facing the court as to
the meaning of inherent risk of injury.
d. Rebuttable Presumption
The question remains as to what constitutes sufficient evi-
dence to rebut the presumption. The court in Pizza v. Wolf
Creek reconciled a rebuttable presumption with the principles
of negligence and comparative negligence, by deciding that the
presumption could be rebutted (but did not disappear) when
the plaintiff simply presented evidence of the defendant's neg-
ligence.107 The defendant's argument in Pizza assumed that
sufficient rebuttal evidence required the skier to prove he was
not negligent by a preponderance of the evidence. The statute
was silent on the issue of sufficient rebuttal evidence; there-
fore, the court rejected the stringent requirement of proving a
negative.108
This author's proposed presumption can be rebutted by evi-
dence supporting the argument that the injury occurred be-
cause the defendant created a risk of injury unlikely to occur
and deviated from prevailing coaching or instructional
techniques.
Whether the evidence must present a prima facie case or
constitute a preponderance seems inconsequential in compara-
tive fault jurisdictions. Mentioning the presumption to the jury
serves to place additional emphasis on the inherent risk of
sports by channeling the jury's fact-finding process toward con-
106. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
107. Pizza, 711 P.2d at 678.
108. Id. at 678-79.
[Vol. 10:33
PRESUMPTION OF NON-FAULT
sideration of avoidable versus unavoidable injuries as opposed
to known versus unknown injuries.
e. Death and Chronic Disabling Injuries
Death and chronic disabling injuries in sports often spur liti-
gation because of the severe economic and emotional costs.
Nevertheless, extending the presumption of non-fault to all in-
juries, disabling or not, has merit especially when considering
the options for judicial management of frivolous cases. °9 Ar-
guably, the presumption will discourage plaintiffs' lawyers
from filing lawsuits for minor injury claims.
The rebuttable presumption of non-fault would reinforce the
proposition that injuries inherent in sports are ultimately the
responsibility of the injured party. A necessary corollary to
this presumption of non-fault is the need for a jury instruction
equating inherent injuries of athletic participation to accepta-
ble and reasonable risk, which are not compensable in the tort
system.10
The sports community has adopted consent forms not so
much to provide an informed choice to the prospective athlete,
but rather to serve as a litigation defense tactic."' The issue of
an informed choice generally arises only after an injury has oc-
curred and the theory of negligence is unavailable to support a
claim for damages. Considering the role of sports in our society,
an informed choice of athletic participation, in realistic terms,
109. Although frivolous litigation may mean strictly nonmeritorious claims, it is
used in this context to include minor injuries and very small claims where the poten-
tial award may not justify the cost of litigation and the lawyer's time and effort.
110. A jury instruction might be worded as follows:
Football is a contact sport in which trauma and certain injuries are inherent
and considered by law to be reasonable risks of participation. The mere fact
that an injury occurs does not, of itself, raise an inference of an unreasonable
risk of injury to a participant. Ordinarily, therefore, you may not find de-
fendant's conduct to have constituted negligence without having before you
some evidence from which you are able to infer that the defendant created an
unreasonable risk of injury endangering the participant.
Cf ALEXANDER'S JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON MEDICAL ISSUES § 2-11 (2d ed. 1980).
111. For example, in Washington, the Seattle School District requires each parent
and student to sign an assumption of the risk release form that is tailored to specific
sports such as football, baseball and basketball. The sports specific consent forms not
only identify a multitude of potential injuries but also includes language releasing the
Seattle School District from liability for ordinary negligence. Unless a school district
is statutorily immune from ordinary negligence, the release portion of this form may
be in violation of public policy. Such a finding would eliminate any benefit from a
signed form other than the information disclosing potential injury. See also supra
note 79 and accompanying text.
1987]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
may simply mean a disclosure of serious physical consequences
of athletics. Once serious injuries and potential long-term
physical impairments are identified for the participant, the ath-
lete's opportunity to reduce risk has been provided.
Conclusion
Various refinements and adjustments to the tort system may
engineer a more equitable resolution for individual responsibil-
ity for injury in athletics. The interrelationship among sports,
medicine and law, with each discipline offering a distinct rea-
soning process, may provide the answer to these problems.
By directing the tort system's focus toward the mechanics of
injury, the parties will address and differentiate between inher-
ent risks and perilous conditions created by the defendant. To
the extent that reasonable risks of injury are incidental to a
given sport, a rebuttable presumption of nonresponsibility un-
derscores the evidentiary necessity to prove that the plaintiff's
injury resulted from injurious factors created by the defendant.
To the extent that inherent risks are characterized as reason-
able, and risk factors created by the negligence of the defend-
ant are synonymous with unreasonable conduct, the sports
community can be assured that the trier of fact will not only
maintain an inherent risk perspective, but will more readily
perceive the weight to be given to the reasonable risk of injury
in the comparative fault evaluation.
[Vol. 10:33
